

## Relooking at Sense and Reference

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In his 'Aspects of the Problem of Reference', published in four issues of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, late Professor Sundra Rajan has given lot of importance to metaphorical language.<sup>1</sup> In order to clarify Paul Ricoeur's views on this kind of language, he was led to discuss not only the views of the classical thinkers like Plato and Aristotle, but also the views of the recent thinkers like Brentano, Meinong, Frege, Husserl, Heidegger, Quine, Kripke, Cassirer, Derrida, Searl, Strawson and so many other supposedly major and minor thinkers who have attracted the attention of publishers, thereby also the attention of readers. The context of Sundra Rajan's discussion is the distinction between sense and reference. Frege argued for this distinction so persuasively that, perhaps, it is more popular in the Anglo-American world than in the continent where it took its birth. Frege's echo had reached even the Indian subcontinent. Fashions in Western philosophy change swiftly. Though we cannot create a new fashion, either in the Western or in the Indian philosophy, we are experts in playing a second fiddle to a fashion, and immediately transfer our artistic talent to our students. So the tradition goes on). Frege's distinction between sense and reference is restricted to the uses of non-metaphorical language. Sundra Rajan has attempted to show how Ricoeur has extended Frege's distinction to the metaphorical uses of language, that there 'is not only a metaphorical sense but also a metaphorical reference'.<sup>2</sup> In order to establish the distinction between sense and reference Frege took the example of 'morning star is the evening star', showing that the expressions 'morning star' and 'evening star' have different senses, yet these expressions refer to the same star' that have different senses, the Venus. So two numerically different expressions may have different senses, yet the same reference. So the sense of an expression differs from its reference. But what about Nietzsche's metaphorical statement 'Truth is a woman'?<sup>3</sup> This statement is grammatically similar to the statement 'Dog is an animal'. But are they also logically similar? How

could they be? One is literally true, the other one is only metaphorically true? What is metaphorical truth? We are advised not to see any literal sense in Nietzsche's statement. For the reason, as Sundra Rajan points out, 'it is only when the customary or literal sense is seen to be absurd, that the situation is saved by interpreting the expression according to a metaphorical sense'.<sup>4</sup> But what is the literal sense of the statement 'Truth is a woman' which we are supposed to avoid, or which we are supposed to consider absurd? And what is its metaphorical sense which we should happily accept? The issue deserves serious attention, but we are not yet so clear about it so as to continue discussing it.

In order to clarify Ricoeur's position Sundra Rajan starts with the issue of an 'absolute text', i.e. a text without the involvement of references. Ricoeur rejects the idea of such an ideal text. For him all texts have references. But in the same breath he makes an exception to this rule. According to Ricoeur, as Sundra Rajan quotes, 'Discourse cannot fail to be about something. In saying this, I am denying the ideology of absolute texts. Only a few sophisticated texts along the line of Mallarme's poetry satisfy this ideal of a text without reference. But this modern kind of literature stands as a limiting case and an exception. It cannot provide key to all other texts, including poetic texts. In one manner or other, poetic texts speak about the world, but not in a descriptive way. The reference here is not abolished but divided or split.'<sup>5</sup> Modern art, be it poetry, painting, sculpture or fiction is heading towards anti-realism. Why does art if the artist wishes only to photograph reality? Handling a camera is a far easier task than handling a brush or a pen. Poetry differs from a piece of prose, not only in its style, but also in its purpose. If description is the purpose, then there are so many other devices of description, far more accurate and safer than poetry, painting or fiction. Essence of poetry, and art in general, consists in transcending reality, in its withdrawal from it. It is not very unlike metaphysics which involves spatio-temporal expressions, yet transcends the world of space and time. A modern artist would reject all those texts which involve reference. According to him most of that which goes in the name of art is not art but imitation. Ricoeur himself accepts that there are texts which have no reference. So he is the supporter only of a weaker thesis, the thesis that some texts have references. But even his weak thesis involves difficulties.

Ricoeur presents his weak thesis in the garb of a strong thesis. This strength he gets from Frege. As Sundra Rajan points out that according to Frege, '... we are not satisfied with sense alone. We pre-

suppose besides a reference'.<sup>6</sup> But Frege restricts this presupposition only to scientific statements. The extension of this presupposition to the language of art is a non-Fregean move. As Sundra Rajan quotes Frege on the nature of the poetic sentences that 'we are interested only in the sense of the sentences and the images and feelings aroused'. This is echoed by Carnap who says 'the aim of a lyrical poem in which occurs the words "sunshine" and "cloud" which are not to inform us of certain meteorological facts but to express certain feelings of the poet and to excite similar feelings in us.'<sup>7</sup> The source for the distinction between "descriptive sense" and "emotive sense" for which the logical positivists have become reputed, is Frege. This distinction is important for the reason that only that sense presupposes a reference which is descriptive, for a description presupposes picking out of the thing that has been described. No such presupposition is involved with the sentences expressing only our feelings and emotions.

Further, Ricoeur's doing away with description, yet retaining reference is highly objectionable. It contradicts his own view. He considers, according to Sundra Rajan, that in a sentence, 'the subject is the instrument of identification, while the predicate is the instrument of characterization....The sentence is a functional unity of identification and predication. It is a saying of something about something'.<sup>8</sup> If the function of the subject is to refer to something, then the function of the predicate is to describe the thing referred to. In Kant's idiom, if the sentence is synthetic, then the predicate adds something new to the subject. But it is not always the case that first I pick out the subject with the help of a referring expression and then describe the subject so picked out. Sometimes picking out of the subject is made possible by the use of descriptive expressions, i.e. the expressions that are generally used as descriptions. Suppose, one does not know the name of the person to whom I am referring, then I may use such descriptive expressions as 'the tall man over there', 'the man in that corner of the room', etc.<sup>9</sup> Reference and description are, perhaps, more intimately connected than sense and reference. On occasions a descriptive expression may function as a referring expression.<sup>10</sup> But the fact that there is a possibility of a text having sense but no reference shows that the relation between them is only contingent.

How could Ricoeur do away with description, yet retain reference? One may argue in favour of Ricoeur that the descriptive use of language is not exhaustive. There are such forms of language as commands,

requests, orders, etc., which are not descriptive. For example, 'Close the door' is not a description of the door, yet it refers to the door. So one may talk about the door, refer to it, without at all characterising or describing it. Non-descriptive use of language exhibits the possibility of reference without description. But Nietzsche's 'Truth is a woman' is certainly not either a command or a request or an order. On its face Nietzsche's sentence appears belonging to a descriptive type of language. Yet it is not a description. But if the description has failed the reference too has failed. Nietzsche has said nothing about anything, he has only caricatured the saying of something about something. The language that contains metaphors, be it the language of poetry or of fiction, contains only spurious descriptions, the descriptions which could be neither true nor false. They are not nonsensical, for they give vent to the feelings and emotions of their authors. Since the metaphors look like literally meaningful expressions, they drag the philosophers to all kinds of analyses. Since ages this has been going on.

Of course, Ricoeur's patronage of metaphorical language is not very unlike Aristotle's patronage. Only an Aristotle could save metaphorical language from Plato's attack. Ricoeur is making a similar attempt in our age. It would not be out of context to bring our attention to Plato and Aristotle, for their analysis of metaphor even now remains quite fresh. A word of caution about Plato's *Phaedrus* which we would like to discuss. We would like to avoid the issue of Plato's preference for speech over writing as expressed in *Phaedrus*. Both Ricoeur and Derrida have written on this issue extensively.<sup>11</sup> The writing that Plato condemns was that which was invented by Theuth, an Egyptian god. It is this writing which is in use. Plato distinguishes this writing from the writing that is inscribed on the soul. So Theuth's writing, or our writing, is thrice removed from the original writing, as it has passed through the medium of speech. However, we would avoid this issue. Since metaphors occur in both, speech and writing, the distinction between the two is of secondary importance.

The issue of metaphorical language, and the use of metaphor, was taken up by Plato in two of his dialogues, *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*. Again, there are two vehicles of metaphors according to Plato—rhetoric and poetry. *Gorgias* defines or describes rhetoric as 'the ability to persuade with speeches'.<sup>12</sup> By persuasive speech Plato means oratory. So rhetoric means nothing but oratory, which became a professional art of the sophists. They rejected the critical Socratic method which

proceeds in the 'question-answer form'. Plato calls the Socratic method dialectic, distinguishing it from rhetoric which is nothing but oratory. Plato's devotion to Socrates and his method of doing philosophy can be seen from the fact that all the dialogues of Plato have been written in the dialectic form. The very expression 'dialogue' means conversation in a dialectic form, the form of question and answer. And Plato's rejection of rhetoric can be derived from the fact that he did not write an independent dialogue on 'Rhetoric', what he wrote on it formed only a part of what he wrote on so many other issues. This was also his attitude towards poetry. There is no independent dialogue on poetry as well. Both rhetoric and poetry are given secondary importance by Plato, both have been treated in the same fashion in the same dialogues. But for Aristotle both these disciplines deserve serious attention. So he wrote independently on both of them with the titles 'Rhetoric' and 'Poetics'. And Aristotle diminishes the importance of dialectic by discussing it in the context of rhetoric. This does not mean that Aristotle favours the sophists; he rejects both, Plato and the sophists. The fashion in which the Greeks wrote exhibits their commitment.

Plato provided two grounds for rejecting rhetoric, the method that attracted the sophists. First, that there is no special subject-matter of rhetoric and, second, that the use of persuasion is shared even by other arts. If rhetoric is an art, then according to Socrates, it should behave like other arts and it should have its won subject-matter. Weaving is concerned with 'the manufacture of clothes', and music with 'the making of tunes'. What, then, is the concern of rhetoric? The answer that 'Rhetoric is concerned with speeches' does not satisfy Socrates. Other arts also make use of speeches. Would they then become rhetoric?<sup>13</sup> Even the character of persuasion does not distinguish rhetoric from other arts. Rhetoric, according to Socrates, 'is not the only producer of persuasion.'<sup>14</sup> Persuasion is quite pervasive, in the sense that no art or science or philosophy would survive without it. As Wittgenstein remarks, 'How much we are doing in changing the style of thinking and how much I'm doing in persuading people to change their style of thinking.'<sup>15</sup> Plato is questioning the restriction of rhetoric to given subject-matter. So rhetoric is rejected on both the counts—its having no subject-matter and its restriction to a subject-matter.

After questioning the status of rhetoric as an art, Plato comes to the crucial final step that 'Rhetoric is not an art but a craft devoid of

art'.<sup>16</sup> Rhetoricians are crafty people who are hardly interested in truth. They are only in search for the devices of persuasion. As Plato remarks: 'For the orator and his rhetoric, there is no need to know the truth of the actual matter, but one merely needs to have discovered some device of persuasion.'<sup>17</sup> The discovery of truth is not the concern of a rhetorician. But then, 'He who knows not the truth, pursues opinion, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not art at all.'<sup>18</sup> It seems that the sophists were quite successful practitioners of their art, otherwise Plato would not have been led to call them crafty people who were the producers of ridiculous speeches.

Poets are no better than the rhetoricians. Both rhetoric and poetry are far removed from truth and knowledge. The virtues of truth and knowledge are restricted to the dialecticians and philosophers. If you compare a piece of rhetoric with a piece of poetry, you will find both of them full of metaphors, similes and analogies. Once metaphors, similes and analogies are withdrawn, both poetry and rhetoric would fall. Poetry would lose its poetic character, it would become an ordinary uninspiring prose. So would rhetoric become an ordinary speech without having any persuasive power to move the audience. Consider how the man addresses the woman in the third song of 'Song of Songs' from the *Old Testament*:

How beautiful you are, my love!  
Your hair dances like a flock of goats,  
Bounding down the hills of Gilead.  
Your breasts are like gazelles,  
Twin deer feeding among lillies.

Now consider how the woman addresses the man in the fourth song:

My lover is handsome and strong;  
His body is like smooth ivory,  
With sapphires set in it.  
His thighs are columns of Alabaster,  
Set in sockets of gold.

(How different is Nietzsche from the *Old Testament*! Suppose, a woman, say, a feminist, is as suspicious of men as Nietzsche of women. If out of her suspicion she is led to say that 'Truth is a man', then she too would create a stir. Men would frown on her, as women frown on Nietzsche.)

Aristotle considered similes and analogies as the extended forms of metaphor.<sup>19</sup> So we can safely say that the parts of the songs quoted above excel in their use of metaphors. Remove metaphors from these songs, all the poetic character of these songs would vanish. The most interesting feature of these songs is that the Jews interpret them quite differently from the Christians. According to the Jews these songs picture the 'relationship between God and his people', whereas the Christians find in them the picture of the 'relationship between Christ and the Church'.<sup>20</sup> So these songs are not very unlike unrealistic art-pieces which are open to all kinds of interpretations. There is no such thing as *the* interpretation of art, simply because art is not a simple photograph of reality.

Metaphors are the cosmetics, not only of poetry, but also of rhetoric. Plato considers rhetoric as the cosmetically created beauty and distinguishes it from the natural beauty. Of course, Plato presupposes that the natural beauty requires no cosmetics, no ornamentation, no make-up of any sort. Plato considers the cosmetically created beauty as a person whose exclusive job is to deceive men. Plato uses all kinds of derogatory epithets for her. According to him, 'with its rascally, deceitful ignoble, and illiberal nature it deceives men by forms and colours, polish and dress, so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through gymnastic'.<sup>21</sup> If Plato is right, then the natural beauty, or the beauty that is native, comes from the gymnastic centres. But the artificial beauty, the beauty of the extraneous sort, comes from the beauty-parlours. Men are certainly bewitched by the extraneous beauty, otherwise they would not have neglected the beauty of the natural or native sort. (Plato is certainly not a woman-hater like Nietzsche. But his preference goes to the athletes rather than the ordinary women, moving in public places, wearing all kinds of provocative dresses and cosmetics.) The function of metaphors in rhetoric, as also in poetry, is to provide 'forms and colours, polish and dress'. But this kind of provision would produce only an extraneous beauty, not the beauty of the natural kind. Of course, men may temporarily be deceived by an extraneous beauty. This deception could not be enduring. Once colours are washed out, once polish fades away, the result would certainly not be a beautiful form. Remove metaphors from rhetoric, oratory would lose all its persuasive power. The orator would be left without audience. Similarly, poets and singers would lose their bread once metaphors are removed from their poems and songs.

*Phaedrus* is like *Gorgias* in presenting a critique of rhetoric. But the former dialogue is also quite unlike the latter one, for the former also suggested ways and means for improving rhetoric. If rhetoric adopts those ways and means, it would be converted into a respectable art. Rhetoric has to present itself as a natural beauty. So the precondition is that it unmask its make-up, it removes its cosmetics. Then it has to start doing the gymnastic exercises. What is the analogue of gymnastic in the speech-situation? Plato has provided not one but many analogues, many physical exercises to be performed by rhetoric to become presentable. Only giving up of metaphor is not sufficient. 'All great arts', according to Plato, 'demand discussion and high speculation.'<sup>22</sup> If a rhetorician wishes to become a great artist, he has to get himself involved in two gymnastic exercises, the exercises of 'discussion' and 'high speculation'. But getting involved in discussion means getting involved in a discourse that proceeds in raising questions and answering them. But this is the ideal of dialectic. This becomes clear from his other prescriptions of gymnastic exercises. The gymnastic exercise of 'knowledge' is most important. As Plato points out, 'If you are naturally rhetorical, you will become a notable orator, when to your natural endowment you have added knowledge.'<sup>23</sup> Knowledge is the highest epistemic stage to which a philosopher reaches after passing through the stage of 'opinion or belief'. This is also the ideal of dialectic. A real rhetorician, not the one who is involved in beautifying his speeches with metaphors, should also know the various 'forms of soul'. 'Since it is the function of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul.'<sup>24</sup> Plato is certainly not referring to an 'empirical soul', for such a soul cannot be the object of knowledge, but it would be an object only of a belief. So Plato wishes to suggest his rhetorician to visit the transcendental realm. Plato rejected the thesis that the soul is identical with the body. Does he mean to say in this context that the form of one soul differs from the form of the other soul?

The above discussion might have clarified that Plato wishes to dissolve rhetoric and to convert it into dialectic in order to accept it as a respectable art. This is a sophisticated way of rejecting rhetoric. So *Phaedrus* remains as unsympathetic to rhetoric as *Gorgias*.

Coming back to Sundra Rajan, he points out that 'under the influence of classical rhetoricians and stylists, metaphor was reduced to a figure of speech and was classified along with the other tropes, as an ornament of speech'.<sup>25</sup> Our discussion of Plato might have

succeeded in clarifying that the classical rhetoricians and stylists were influenced by Plato in considering metaphor as having no other value than that of an ornament. Plato's arguments were sufficiently persuasive. If Plato is accepted, then, to quote from Sundra Rajan again, 'metaphor becomes merely an ornamental or stylistic device, whose only value is psychological or heuristic. Its sense is emotive and the question of its reference or truth hardly arises'.<sup>26</sup> Plato's arguments for converting metaphor into an ornament of speech were so convincing that Aristotle was required to meet them. Let us now see how does Aristotle meet Plato. Ricoeur rejects both Plato and Aristotle, therefore, a discussion on Aristotle's view is also required. One should know the view that is rejected.

Aristotle's treatment of rhetoric, so also of dialectic, is not very unlike Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophy. Wittgenstein's predecessors thought that philosophy required to have a special subject-matter of its own, a body of its own propositions like physics, physiology, geography, etc. Search for the special propositions of philosophy led to such a state of crisis that the question 'What is philosophy?' was itself converted into a philosophical question, a question involving all kinds of uncertainties. So Wittgenstein provided a great relief to philosophers, when he declared that philosophy is not a body of propositions, it is only an activity or a method. And this activity is directed towards all kinds of propositions, be they from physics or geography. Prior to Aristotle, Socrates and Plato included, philosophers were under the impression that all genuine studies were some kind of art or science, and each one of them had its own subject-matter. So rhetoric too, if it were to be considered as an art, was expected to have a special subject-matter of its own, and got worried about that subject-matter. It was left for Aristotle to realise that rhetoric is only a method, not very unlike the method of dialectic, and therefore, it is deprived of any special subject-matter, or the subject-matter of all genuine arts is open to the rhetorical treatment.

Aristotle brought rhetoric closer to dialectic. According to him, 'both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and are not confined to any special science'.<sup>27</sup> There is no special subject-matter either of rhetoric or of dialectic. The respect that Plato gave to dialectic was withdrawn by Aristotle. Aristotle introduces his Rhetoric with the remark, 'Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic' meaning 'not an exact copy, but making a kind of pair with it'.<sup>28</sup> Pairing off the two is meant for bringing them closer to one

another, not dissolving their differences. Plato presents sophists as rhetoricians who had no ability to proceed in the 'question-answer form', who had mastery of oratory without having any mastery of dialectic. But Aristotle's sophists were masters of both the methods. According to him, 'the training given by the paid professors of contentious arguments was like the treatment of the matter by Gorgias. For they used to hand out speeches to be learnt by heart, some rhetorical others in the form of question and answer.'<sup>29</sup> Aristotle calls sophists as 'paid professors' for the sophists used to charge money for their speeches and writings.

Aristotle paints sophists as the degenerate dialecticians. He brings sophistry closer to dialectic than to rhetoric. As he writes: 'The essence of sophistry consists in moral purpose, the deliberate use of fallacious arguments. In Dialectic, the dialectician has the power or faculty of making use of them when he pleases; when he does so he is called a sophist.'<sup>30</sup> It is because the sophists have mastery of dialectic, that they can misuse it. Sophistry is not an independent art or technique or method. It is a parasite that has been generated by, and lives on, rhetoric and dialectic. Sophistry becomes possible, according to Aristotle, because 'Rhetoric and Dialectic alone, of all the arts prove opposites; for both are equally concerned with them.'<sup>31</sup> Not only rhetoric, dialectic too could be misused. Aristotle seems to have clearer understanding of both rhetoric and dialectic than Plato.

Aristotle defines Rhetoric as 'the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatsoever... medicine deals with health and sickness, geometry with the properties of magnitude.... But Rhetoric, so to say, appears to be able to discover the means of persuasion in reference to any given area.'<sup>32</sup> So the Platonic definition of rhetoric in terms of 'the art of persuasion' is not given up. Only the Platonic *anxiety* about the 'subject-matter of rhetoric' is given up. Again, for Aristotle also, rhetoric remains distinct from dialectic. 'It belongs to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to discover real and apparent syllogism.'<sup>33</sup> On occasions syllogistic reasoning may fail to convince people for accepting a given view. On those occasions the art of rhetoric comes to the rescue.

Now consider Aristotle's treatment of metaphor. Aristotle condemns Plato for his rejection of metaphors. Not everybody is capable of generating metaphors. One can learn higher physics from others, one can learn higher mathematics from others, but the production of

metaphors 'cannot be learnt from anyone else' is the view of Aristotle.<sup>34</sup> So only a genius can generate metaphors. Has not Plato given a metaphorical description of rhetoric when he calls it 'extraneous beauty'? Can a piece of rhetoric use lipstick, rouge, ear-rings, bodice and so on? Plato himself was a master-craftsman of metaphors. They provided poetic qualities to his dialogues. Aristotle was led to describe Socratic 'Dialogues' as poetry.<sup>35</sup> Plato condemned poetry, unaware of the fact that the people would find poetic qualities in his writings. Of course, Plato rejected poetry, not only because it involved metaphors, but his fundamental objection against poetry was that it was an art like painting, sculpture, etc. It was an 'imitation of imitation'; it was thrice removed from reality. So also rhetoric was rejected, not only because it involved metaphors, the fundamental objection against rhetoric was, as has already been discussed earlier, that rhetoric is not any kind of art, but it is rather a craft. Metaphor became a handy weapon to reject both rhetoric and poetry in one stroke. But that stroke also kills his 'Dialogues'. This means that there is absolutely nothing wrong if metaphors are used in philosophy. But everything is wrong if they are used in poetry and rhetoric. This exhibits Plato's prejudice, and we are not required in philosophy to discuss prejudices.

It is interesting to note that Aristotle, like Plato, finds metaphor as a common ingredient in both, rhetoric and poetry. The *Poetics* has given the following definition of metaphor: 'Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else, the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species or on the ground of analogy.'<sup>36</sup> Through this definition Aristotle is interested in showing how a metaphor is constructed. Thus the general name 'woman' belongs to such persons whose proper names are 'Sona' 'Suman', 'Indrani' and so on. Nietzsche has made a metaphorical use of the name 'woman' when he applied it to 'truth'. He has given the name to, a thing that belongs to something else. Ricoeur finds Aristotle's view of metaphor quite narrow since 'it looks upon metaphor as an expression substituted in the place of another.'<sup>37</sup> Maybe Aristotle's view is quite narrow, but quite interesting. He has given persuasive arguments in favour of his view.

Aristotle is attracted towards metaphors because they are required to improve the *style* of speech. They enhance the persuasive power of speech. Ordinary mode of speech would fail to persuade; some extraordinary innovation is required. Concerning the style of speech Aristotle remarks, 'Departure from the ordinary makes it appear more dignified.

In this respect men feel the same with regard to style as to that of the foreigners and fellow citizens. Wherefore we should give our language a 'foreign air', for men admire what is remote.<sup>38</sup> How right is Aristotle! Since we are ourselves resident Indians, these Indians hardly attract our attention. We are attracted more towards the 'non-resident Indians', because they live in lands, far remote from our land. They have acquired foreign habits, even though they may be only selling pickles and tomatoes there. They are no more native Indians; they are nearer to complete foreigners. Of course, they are short of being complete foreigners whom we respect most. Do we not feel ourselves more important when we write on the fashions of 'foreign philosophy' than on what goes on in our own land? Native philosophy seems to us outdated, it appears as a total mess. Even to become a known native philosopher, foreign blessings are required. So in the style of our speech we must acquire a 'foreign air'. The 'foreign air' would liberate us from the suffocation of the 'native air'.

The words that we use in our speech should be native, not foreign, but their use should not be native, i.e. their *use* should be native. The unusual use of words would certainly provide a foreign air to our speech. Aristotle introduces the distinction between natural and artificial words in speech. According to him 'that which is natural persuades, but the artificial does not.'<sup>39</sup> So not only the words from foreign languages are ruled out, even the words from the artificial languages are also ruled out. Aristotle finds metaphors as the most persuasive elements in speech. They provide the maximum amount of persuasion to a speech. It is because of them that our speech gets a foreign air. 'It is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air.'<sup>40</sup> Thus, Nietzsche has provided 'foreign air' by bringing a woman to describe the nature of 'truth'. A similar thing has been done by Plato, when he brought a lady with a powdered face to describe the nature of 'rhetoric'. (We should not forget that since ages we have been living in a male-dominated society, where women have remained a major object of public exposure. If a female-dominated society occurs, of which the possibility cannot be ruled out, then the constituents of metaphors, so also of beauty-competitions, are certainly going to change.)

Lastly on Aristotle. Consider the issue of art. Plato's was the age of realistic art, so there was a talk about reality and its imitation. Plato declared that all art is imitation. But this is not to degrade art, it is to upgrade art according to Aristotle. Imitation is something which only

men (women included) are capable of doing. This ability distinguishes men from animals. Therefore, only men can be artists. Again, Aristotle's teleological view about nature implies that nature is not yet complete, it is heading towards completeness. Nature has evolved man to complete the job that nature has left incomplete. A production of an art-piece exhibits human excellence. Plato has rejected the use of 'forms and colours, polish and dress' on a human body simply because a human body has not taken its birth with them. A woman has not taken her birth with lipstick on her lips, powder and rouge on her cheeks, and so many other kinds of cosmetics and tailored dresses suiting the form of her body. How does it show that she should not use them, she should not do what nature has left undone? Plato was not born with Socratic 'Dialogues' in his hands; he had a human urge to write them. The urge to beautify oneself is also a human urge, an urge that distinguishes human beings from animals. That person is to be highly praised who converts himself/herself into an art-piece. How does it matter if all persons do not have this artistic talent! The fact that all persons do not have the talent to produce Socratic 'Dialogues' does not mean that Plato should not have done it. We should not forget that art is far more important than philosophy. If Plato is right, then one can become a philosopher only when one becomes old and fossilised. So art symbolises youth, philosophy, old age.

Since we started this discussion with Ricoeur, as presented by Sundra Rajan, let us close this discussion with them. Even a superficial study of Ricoeur would show that so far as the sense of a metaphorical expression is concerned, it continues behaving like the sense of a literally meaningful expression. Like the sense of the literal expression, there are no distinctions and divisions in the sense of a metaphorical expression as well. But the reference connected with a metaphorical expression behaves quite differently from the reference connected with a literally meaningful expression. The reference of the former gets split up. As quoted earlier, according to Ricoeur, the reference in the case of a metaphor 'is not abolished but divided or split'. So the non-divided and non-split sense leads us to the divided and split up reference. But how is that possible? Explaining the position of Ricoeur, Sundra Rajan writes, 'Sense is immanent in discourse but reference moves language beyond itself to the things of the world.'<sup>41</sup> This means that what occurs in discourse, or written in the text, is read out in the world. If the text does not contain a divided sense, how could it lead to a divided reference? The potentiality for division must be written

in the sense of the text itself, only then is there a possibility for language to catch the divided reference of the text. The language should not project into the world what the sense of the text does not contain. Either the reference of a metaphor is not divided, or, its sense too is divided. We should follow the sense of a text, in order to catch its reference. Of course, the very search for sense and reference in connection with metaphor is rooted in the assimilation of metaphors to literally meaningful expressions.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See the following issues of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XVII, No. 4, October 1990; Vol. XVIII, No. 1, January 1991; Vol. XVIII, No. 2, April 1991 and Vol. XVIII, No. 3, July 1991.
2. *Ibid.*, XVIII, No. 2, April 1991, p. 153
3. *Ibid.*, p. 456. Ricoeur describes Nietzsche as 'the master of suspicion'. Is Nietzsche suspicious of 'woman' or of 'truth' or of both?
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
9. Wittgenstein is the source of this analysis. See *Philosophical Investigations*, 404. Securing of reference, Wittgenstein calls as the issue of 'personal identity.'
10. Perhaps this is what Strawson means when he attacks Russell for his rigid distinction between 'referring' and 'descriptive' expressions. See P.F. Strawson "On Referring", originally published in *Mind*, (1950).
11. See J. Derrida's attack on Plato's *Phaedrus* in "Plato's Pharmacy", *Dissemination*, London, 1981, pp. 61-171.
12. *Gorgias*, 452E, trans. W.P. Lamb, Harvard: Loeb Library.
13. *Ibid.*, 450B.
14. *Ibid.*, 454A.
15. *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, Oxford: Cyril Barrett, Blackwell, 1978, 40.
16. This step has been taken in the *Phaedrus*, See *Phaedrus*, H.N. Fowler (tr.), Harvard, Loeb Library, 200E.
17. *Gorgias*, 459C.
18. *Phaedrus*, 262C.
19. See *Rhetoric*, J.H. Freeze (tr.), Harvard: Loeb Library, 1406b.
20. See Introduction to the "Song of Songs", *Old Testament*, American Bible Society, New York, 1976, p. 1647.
21. *Gorgias*, 464b.
22. *Phaedrus*, 269E.
23. *Ibid.*, 269D.

24. *Ibid.*, 271D.
25. Sundra Rajan, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, April 1991, p. 178.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Rhetoric*, 1354A.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *On Sophistical Refutations*, 183, Richard Mckeon (ed.), Random House, 1941
30. *Rhetoric*, 1356b.
31. *Ibid.*, 1355a.
32. *Ibid.*, 1355b.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Poetics*, 1459a., J.H. Freeze (tr.), Harvard, Loeb Library.
35. *Ibid.*, 1447b.
36. *Ibid.*, 1457.
37. Sundra Rajan, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, April 1991, p. 178.
38. *Rhetoric*, 1404b.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. Sundra Rajan, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, April 1991, p. 161. Not at one, but at many places Ricoeur's remarks allow this kind of objection to his position. Consider one more remark, 'the textual reference is to literal reference what metaphorical sense is to ordinary or literal sense' (*ibid.*, p. 188). When the metaphorical sense emerges after the suppression of the literal sense, no distinctions and divisions occur in the former sense. So should behave the metaphorical reference. But Ricoeur allows metaphorical reference to behave very differently from the literal reference.

